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rivals. We numerically solve the model for its Markov-perfect equilibria. For one set of parameter values, three
equilibria exist, and while all of them have simple, intuitive structures, they exhibit widely varying patterns of
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1 Introduction
In oligopolistic industries firms face at least two types of uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty
about the evolution of demand and possibly also production technology. This type of uncertainty is
typically exogenous to the industry. Second, there is uncertainty that emerges endogenously from
the strategic decisions of firms. This strategic uncertainty often arises because a firm does not
know the exact cost structure of its rivals and therefore cannot perfectly predict their decisions.
It matters because a firm’s decision regarding capacity addition and withdrawal, say, has both an
immediate impact on the profitability of its rivals and the potential to shape the evolution of the
industry for years to come.
In practice demand uncertainty and strategic uncertainty are important, and the strategic
management literature on capacity decisions exhorts managers to think carefully about both. For
example, in his classic work Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter writes: “Because capacity addi-
tions can involve lead times measured in years and capacity is often long lasting, capacity decisions
require the firm to commit resources based on expectations about conditions far into the future.
Two types of expectations are crucial: those about future demand and those about competitors’
behavior. The importance of the former in capacity decisions is obvious. Accurate expectations
about competitors’ behavior is essential as well” (Porter 1980, p. 324). Highlighting how strategic
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uncertainty can complicate the formation of expectations about competitors’ behavior, Porter goes
on to state, “If firms have differing perceptions of each other’s relative strengths, resources, and
staying power, they tend to destabilize the capacity expansion process” (pp. 332–333).
Demand uncertainty has received much attention in the literature, and there is by now a large
body of research about investment under this type of uncertainty (see Dixit & Pindyck 1994). This
real options theory mainly considers monopolistic or perfectly competitive settings. There are but
a few papers combining real options theory with the strategic interactions that arise in dynamic
games played by multiple firms. Most study simple games that end once the option has been
exercised (e.g., Smets 1991, Grenadier 1996, Lambert & Perraudin 2003, Boyer, Lasserre, Mariotti
& Moreaux 2004, Huisman & Kort 2004, Pawlina & Kort 2006, Mason & Weeds 2007). Examples
include adopting a new technology or entering a new market.1 It is not possible to partially recover
the investment or to follow up on it with additional investments.
In Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010) we consider a setting that is flexible enough
to characterize fully or partially sunk investment. Our model of an oligopolistic industry is fully
dynamic in that a firm can each period decide to add or withdraw capacity. While we abstract
from demand uncertainty, we capture the strategic uncertainty that firms face about their rivals’
investment/disinvestment decisions by assuming that a firm is privately informed about its own
cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal. We show that, under certain conditions, the evolution
of the industry takes the form of a race. Each firm invests aggressively to expand its capacity before
its rivals can do so. The industry ultimately reaches an asymmetric structure dominated by the
winner of the race. Pursuing an aggressive approach to investment in an attempt to preempt rivals
is thus a deliberate competitive move that has a lasting effect on the structure of the industry. This
is consistent with the dominance of DuPont of the North American titanium dioxide industry that
can be traced back to the preemptive strategy of capacity accumulation that DuPont initiated in
the early 1970’s (Ghemawat 1984, Ghemawat 1997, Hall 1990).
In this paper, we build on Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010) to explore capacity
investment and disinvestment dynamics under both demand and strategic uncertainty. Without
demand uncertainty, the case studied by Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010), the role
of strategic uncertainty is bound to diminish over time: Once the industry has reached a “steady
state,” investment activity comes to a halt, except possibly to make up for depreciation. Hence, it
may not matter much that a firm does not know the exact cost structure of its rivals and therefore
cannot perfectly predict their decisions to add or withdraw capacity. Fluctuations in demand call for
firms to adjust their capacities on an ongoing basis and therefore ensure the continued importance
of strategic uncertainty. Moreover, a sufficiently large swing in demand may upset the established
structure of the industry. Combing the two types of uncertainty in one model allows us to answer
questions regarding the identity of the swing producer and whether a firm is able to maintain—or
perhaps even improve—its competitive position in the face of demand uncertainty.
1Indeed, strategic real options theory can be traced back to Fudenberg & Tirole’s (1985) work on preemption in
the adoption of a new technology.
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2 Model
We incorporate demand uncertainty into the fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with
lumpy capacity and lumpy investment/disinvestment developed and analyzed in Besanko, Doraszel-
ski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010). The description of the model is abridged; we refer the reader to
Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010) for details. The state of demand d takes on
one of D values, 1, 2, . . . , D. There are two firms, indexed by 1 and 2, with potentially differ-
ent capacities q¯i and q¯j , respectively. Capacity is lumpy so that q¯i and q¯j take on one of M
values, 0,∆, 2∆, . . . , (M − 1)∆, where ∆ > 0 measures the lumpiness of capacity. We refer to
(d, i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D} × {0, 1, 2, . . . , (M − 1)}2 as the state of the industry; in state (d, i, j) the
state of demand is d and firm 1 has a capacity q¯i of i∆ units and firm 2 has a capacity q¯j of j∆
units.
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. At the beginning of a period, firms first learn their
cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal. To firm 1 the cost of adding ∆ units of capacity is
ηe,1 = φe + ²eθ1 and the benefit of withdrawing ∆ units is ηw,1 = φw + ²wθ1, where θ1 is a mean-
zero random variable with support [−1, 1], and φe, φw, ²e > 0, and ²w > 0 are location and scale
parameters, respectively. The difference between the expected cost of capacity addition φe and
the expected cost of capacity withdrawal φw is a measure of the expected sunkness of investment.
To capture the changing nature of investment opportunities, we assume that θ1 is drawn anew
each period and that draws are independent across periods and firms. Its cost/benefit of capacity
addition/withdrawal is private to a firm and hence unknown to its rival. Incorporating incomplete
information in this way allows us to capture the strategic uncertainty that firms face about their
rivals’ investment/disinvestment decisions. Increasing the scale parameters ²e and ²w increases this
uncertainty by giving a firm an incentive to time its investment and disinvestment decisions oppor-
tunistically so as to minimize the cost of capacity. Because θ1 is private to firm 1, firm 2 as it makes
its investment/disinvestment decisions in state (d, i, j) “sees” only the investment/disinvestment
probabilities of firm 1,
e1(d, i, j) =
∫
e1(d, i, j, θ1)dF (θ1), w1(d, i, j) =
∫
w1(d, i, j, θ1)dF (θ1),
rather than its decisions e1(d, i, j, θ1) ∈ {0, 1} and w1(d, i, j, θ1) ∈ {0, 1} to add or withdraw ∆
units of capacity.
After firms have made their investment/disinvestment decisions, but before these decision are
implemented, they compete in a differentiated product market by setting prices subject to capacity
constraints. The Nash equilibrium of the product market game determines firms’ single-period
profit functions pi1(d, i, j) and pi2(d, i, j). In the product market game, the demand function for
firm 1 is
q1(p1, p2; d) =
1
1− γ2 (a(1− γ)− bdp1 + γbdp2),
where γ ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of product differentiation (0 for independent goods and 1 for
perfect substitutes). Depending on the state of demand d, the slope bd of this demand function
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takes on one of theD values, i.e., bd ∈ {1.5b, 1.25b, b, 0.75b, 0.5b}, where bd = b is the baseline level of
demand, bd > b is a collapse of demand, and bd < b an expansion. Specifically, the aggregate demand
function is Q(P ; d) = 21+γ (a− bdP ), where P = 12 (p1 + p2), with inverse P (Q; d) = 1bd
(
a− 1+γ2 Q
)
.
A change in bd causes the inverse demand function to rotate about its horizontal intercept. Such a
rotation makes invariant, at any given quantity, the price elasticity of aggregate demand. Therefore,
consumers willingness to pay for any given quantity is two thirds of its baseline level in the worst
demand state d = 1 and double its baseline level in the best demand state d = 5.2 The state of
demand follows an exogenous Markov process. From one period to the next, d goes up or down
with equal probability ρ ∈ (0, 0.5].3 If ρ = 0, then the state of demand never changes, and it surely
changes if ρ = 0.5; hence, ρ is a measure of demand uncertainty. Because the probabilities of going
up and down are equal, the limiting (ergodic) distribution over demand states is uniform and the
expectation of bd is equal to b so that bd = b is indeed the baseline level of demand.
At the end of the period, the investment/disinvestment decisions are implemented and previ-
ously installed capacity is subjected to depreciation. We think of depreciation as being of a physical
nature such as machine breakdowns, technological obsolescence, and natural disasters, and assume
that a firm is subjected to depreciation with probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. The state of demand finally
changes according to the exogenous Markov process specified above. Hence, the industry transits
from its current state (d, i, j) to some other state (d′, i′, j′) at the beginning of the subsequent
period.
The solution concept is symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE). Existence follows from
the arguments in Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2010). Below we focus on the case of almost perfect
substitutes (γ = 0.99), partially sunk investment (φe = 72 and φw = 24), and significant deprecia-
tion (δ = 0.1). We set the stage for strategic uncertainty by assuming substantial variation in the
cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal across firms and periods (²e = 36 and ²w = 12). The
remaining parameter values are as described in Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010).
We use the homotopy path-following method first applied to dynamic stochastic games by Besanko,
Doraszelski, Kryukov & Satterthwaite (2010) (see also Borkovsky, Doraszelski & Kryukov 2010) to
map out the equilibrium correspondence of our game; we are particularly interested in how equi-
librium behavior and the industry dynamics implied by it changes with ρ, our measure of demand
uncertainty.
3 Results
In Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010) we study the special case without demand
uncertainty (D = 1 or ρ = 0). We show that low product differentiation, low investment sunkness,
and high depreciation promote preemption races. During a preemption race, firms continue invest-
ing as long as their capacities are similar. The race comes to an end once one of the firms gains
2An increase in demand for a firm is an outward shift of its demand curve. Three polar cases are rotation around
the horizontal intercept, rotation around the vertical intercept, and parallel shift.
3If demand is in the lowest (highest) state, then we assume that it goes up (down) with probability ρ.
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the upper hand. At this point, the investment process stops and a process of disinvestment starts.
During the disinvestment process some of the excess capacity that has been built up during the
race is removed.4
Low product differentiation intensifies capacity utilization and price competition and incen-
tivizes both the leader and the follower to start the disinvestment process at the end of a preemp-
tion race in order to restore the industry to profitability. Both low investment sunkness and high
depreciation imply high investment reversibility and promote preemption races by allowing firms
to remove some of the excess capacity that has been built up during the race. In contrast, if they
lack a means to remove capacity, then firms have no reason to enter a preemption race in the first
place because they anticipate that the industry will be permanently locked into a state of excess
capacity and low profitability after the race.5
While the idea that reversibility can spur rather than hinder preemption contrasts with con-
ventional wisdom in investment theory (see, e.g., p. 345 of Tirole 1988), it is in line with the
empirical findings in the North American newsprint and U.K. brick industries. These industries
differ mainly in the sunkness of investment. In the former, investment sunkness is low and there is
evidence suggestive of “some sort of race to add capacity” (Christensen & Caves 1997, p. 48). In
the latter, in contrast, investment sunkness is high and “in general brick firms manage to sequence
successfully their capacity expansion insofar as they avoid excessive contemporaneous bunching of
expansions” (Wood 2005, p. 43).
We also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness promote capacity
coordination in the sense that in the long run there is little (if any) excess capacity relative to
the benchmark of a capacity cartel. Therefore, preemption races and excess capacity in the short
run often go hand-in-hand with capacity coordination in the long run. The association of these
seemingly contradictory behaviors is consistent with observing both preemption races and capacity
coordination in the North American newsprint industry where investment is partially sunk. It is also
consistent with Gilbert & Lieberman’s (1987) finding that in the 24 chemical processing industries
studied preemption may be a temporary phenomenon and that “the main role of preemptive activity
is to coordinate new investment and to promote efficiency by avoiding excess capacity” (p. 30).
In the remainder of this paper, we consider the model with demand uncertainty (D > 1 and
ρ > 0). We ask how demand uncertainty affects equilibrium behavior and the industry dynamics
implied by it. Having computed an equilibrium for a particular parameterization of the model, we
use the investment/disinvestment probabilities e1(d, i, j) and w1(d, i, j) along with the exogenous
Markov process governing demand to construct the probability distribution over next period’s
4The “war-of-attrition entry” that Cabral (2004) considers is analogous to the preemption races that arise in our
model. His model, however, has no disinvestment so capacity coordination cannot occur in the long run.
5Besanko & Doraszelski (2004) have previously made the point that high reversibility in the form of signifi-
cant depreciation can spur preemption races. In Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2010) we show that
depreciation—the involuntary withdrawal of capacity—and disinvestment—the voluntary withdrawal of capacity—
are less than perfect substitutes. In particular, although depreciation removes capacity, it may impede capacity
coordination. The reason is that depreciation is beyond the control of firms. Hence, the leader keeps a “safety stock”
of capacity to counter the risk that the industry leadership is lost to depreciation. This hinders the extent of capacity
coordination.
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state (d′, i′, j′) given this period’s state (d, i, j). With this transition matrix in hand, we are able to
characterize equilibrium industry dynamics by computing the distribution over states, and hence the
structure of the industry, at any point in time. The limiting distribution µ(∞) over states describes
the industry in the long run.6 From it, we compute the Herfindahl index of firms’ capacities as
H(∞) =
D∑
d=1
M−1∑
i=0
M−1∑
j=0
((
q¯i
q¯i + q¯j
)2
+
(
q¯j
q¯i + q¯j
)2)
µ(∞)(d, i, j).
The Herfindahl index summarizes expected industry structure and dynamics. To the extent that it
exceeds 0.5, an asymmetric industry structure arises and persists in the long run. We additionally
compute the total capacity of the industry implied by the equilibrium in the long run as
q¯(∞) =
D∑
d=1
M−1∑
i=0
M−1∑
j=0
(q¯i + q¯j)µ(∞)(d, i, j).
We finally compute the total capacity of the industry conditional on the state of demand.
Figure 1 visualizes the equilibrium correspondence for a range of values for ρ, our measure of
demand uncertainty. The top left panel depicts the Herfindahl index, the remaining panels the
total capacity of the industry first unconditional and then conditional on the state of demand. As
can be seen in the top left panel, the equilibrium correspondence consists of a main path that starts
at ρ = 0 and ends at ρ = 0.5. In addition, there is a path that forms an arc starting at ρ = 0 and
ending at ρ = 0. Consequently, for values of ρ below 0.15, there are multiple equilibria. As demand
uncertainty increases further, we have found just one equilibrium.7
The Herfindahl index in the top left panel of Figure 1 and the total capacity of the industry
in the top right panel both change little with demand uncertainty. The Herfindahl index indicates
that the industry is typically highly concentrated. The bottom panels depict the total capacity of
the industry conditional on the state of demand. For clarity the bottom left panel corresponds to
the main path of equilibria and the bottom right panel to the arc. The total capacity of the indus-
try changes with the state of demand. However, the differences generally diminish with demand
uncertainty. This is intuitive because as fluctuations in demand from period to period become more
likely, firms are better off to build capacity to cater to average demand and avoid costly adjustments
to their capacities. That firms act cautiously under demand uncertainty has been demonstrated
both theoretically and empirically. A recent paper by Bloom, Bond & Van Reenen (2007) shows
that with partial irreversibility increased demand uncertainty decreases the responsiveness of in-
vestment to fluctuations. Similar to this, in our model firms become increasingly cautious in their
investment and disinvestment behavior, but they do so in the context of oligopolistic competition
rather than a single-agent decision problem.
We next take a closer look at the differences between the multiple equilibria that arise for a
6Let P be theDM2×DM2 transition matrix of the Markov process of industry dynamics. The limiting distribution
over states solves µ(∞) = µ(∞)P .
7These are the equilibria we have found; there may be others we have not identified.
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particular degree of demand uncertainty. As can be seen in Figure 1, the three equilibria for ρ = 0.1
differ in terms of the Herfindahl index (H(∞) = 0.98, 0.95, and 0.82) and the total capacity of the
industry (q¯(∞) = 4.58, 5.78, and 4.67)8. Even more interesting, the three equilibria exhibit very
different patterns of how the individual firms respond to fluctuations in demand. To illustrate, we
depict in Figures 2–4 the limiting distribution over states.
The first equilibrium gives the most asymmetric long-run industry structure and the lowest
total capacity. As can be seen in Figure 2, the industry is most likely dominated by a large firm
with 4∆ or 5∆ units of capacity while the small firm has 0∆ units. As our model assumes that a
firm with zero capacity faces zero demand, the large firm is in effect a monopolist. Moreover, the
small firm has very little chance to “break into” in the market: Even when demand conditions are
at their most favorable (d = 5, bottom left panel), the small firm is still most likely to have 0∆
units of capacity. The large firm also does little to adjust to fluctuations in demand. It is most
likely to have 4∆ units of capacity in the worst demand state (d = 1, top left panel) compared to
5∆ units in the best demand state (d = 5, bottom left panel).
As a consequence, in the first equilibrium the total capacity increases in expectation from 3.86∆
units in the worst demand state to 5.31∆ units in the best demand state. In contrast, in both the
second and the third equilibrium, the total capacity of the industry is much more responsive to
fluctuations in demand. In the second equilibrium the total capacity increases from 4.26∆ units
in the worst demand state to 7.32∆ units in the best demand state and in the third equilibrium
from 3.93∆ units to 5.36∆ units (see bottom panels of Figure 1). In sum, in the latter two
equilibria, the total capacity of the industry adjusts to meet demand, a phenomenon observed by
Booth, Kanetkar, Vertinsky & Whistler (1991) in their study of the highly cyclical North American
newsprint industry.
In the second equilibrium, in the worst demand state, the industry is almost certainly dominated
by a large firm, most likely with 4∆ units of capacity while the small firm has 0∆ units (see top left
panel of Figure 3). In the best demand state, the industry is still most likely to be dominated by a
large firm, now with 8∆ units of capacity while the small firm has 0∆ units (see bottom left panel).
Thus for most sequences of private shocks to the cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal the
large firm acts as the swing producer that adjusts to fluctuations in demand. Indeed, the leader
defends its dominant position by aggressively investing in up to 8∆ units of capacity, leaving the
follower little room for survival. But for some sequences of private shocks the roles reverse. As can
be seen in the bottom left panel of Figure 3, in the best demand state, there is a good chance that
the industry reaches either state (4, 2) or state (2, 4). Now the follower is the swing producer and
uses “good times” as an opportunity to enter the market and partially catch up with the leader.
The third equilibrium gives the least asymmetric long-run industry structure. As can be seen
in Figure 4, the leader behaves much softer and, in good times, allows the follower to break into
the market. Indeed, the large firm is most likely to remain at 4∆ units of capacity irrespective of
the state of demand. The small firm is always the swing producer.
8Notice that the arc in the top right panel of Figure 1 is inverted relative the one in the top left panel, which
explains that the equilibrium with the second highest H(∞) = 0.95 has the highest q¯(∞) = 5.78.
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Our findings on how the individual firms respond to fluctuations in demand are not easily
explained by the existing literature. Ghemawat & Nalebuff (1985) show that, in a deterministically
declining market, the larger (higher-capacity) firm exits first.9 Ghemawat & Nalebuff (1990) assume
that firms can continuously adjust their capacities (rather than exit) and show that, again, the larger
firm shrinks first. Once it has reached the same size as its rival, both firms continue shrinking
together. Whinston (1988) shows that anything can happen if firms have multiple plants; in
particular the larger firm (with two plants) does not necessarily exit before the smaller firm (with
one plant). What happens depends on the details of the model, and there are no simple rules.
However, if firms differ only in the number of plants that they own and plants are identical, a
scenario that seems close to our model, then the larger firm is necessarily the swing producer
(Whinston 1988, pp. 584–585).
In contrast, our results show that the swing producer can be either the large firm or the small
firm depending on the equilibrium the industry settles on. Since there are multiple equilibria, the
economic primitives do not suffice to tie down firms’ behavior. How the industry evolves depends
on how firms expect the industry to evolve.
In sum, our model of capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics under both demand
and strategic uncertainty generates new and interesting insights. Our examples show that demand
uncertainty can have an impact on the multiplicity of equilibria. Further, as demand becomes
more uncertain, firms become more hesitant to adjust their capacities. Different equilibria exhibit
different levels of aggressiveness in the follower’s threatening expansion and the leader’s defensive
expansion in response to fluctuations in demand. The swing producer can be either the large firm or
the small firm, and sometimes the identity of the swing producer may depend on firms’ expectations
regarding the future evolution of the industry. Whether any of these behaviors generalizes is an
open question that we intend to pursue in future research.
References
Besanko, D. & Doraszelski, U. (2004), ‘Capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm
size’, Rand Journal of Economics 35(1), 23–49.
Besanko, D., Doraszelski, U., Kryukov, Y. & Satterthwaite, M. (2010), ‘Learning-by-doing, orga-
nizational forgetting, and industry dynamics’, Econometrica 78(2), 453–521.
Besanko, D., Doraszelski, U., Lu, L. & Satterthwaite, M. (2010), ‘Lumpy capacity investment and
disinvestment dynamics’, Operations Research forthcoming.
Bloom, N., Bond, S. & Van Reenen, J. (2007), ‘Uncertainty and investment dynamics’, Review of
Economic Studies 74, 391–415.
Booth, D., Kanetkar, V., Vertinsky, D. & Whistler, D. (1991), ‘An empirical model of capacity
expansion and pricing in an oligopoly with barometric price leadership: A case study of the
newsprint industry in North America’, International Economic Review 39, 255–276.
9Fudenberg & Tirole (1986) show that the higher-cost firm exits first.
8
Borkovsky, R., Doraszelski, U. & Kryukov, Y. (2010), ‘A user’s guide to solving dynamic stochastic
games using the homotopy method’, Operations Research forthcoming.
Boyer, M., Lasserre, T., Mariotti, T. & Moreaux, M. (2004), ‘Preemption and rent dissipation
under price competition’, International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 309–328.
Cabral, L. (2004), ‘Simultaneous entry and welfare’, European Economic Review 48(5), 943–957.
Christensen, L. & Caves, R. (1997), ‘Cheap talk and investment rivalry in the pulp and paper
industry’, Journal of Industrial Economics 45, 47–73.
Dixit, A. & Pindyck, R. (1994), Investment under uncertainty, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton.
Doraszelski, U. & Satterthwaite, M. (2010), ‘Computable Markov-perfect industry dynamics’, Rand
Journal of Economics forthcoming.
Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. (1985), ‘Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new
technology’, Review of Economic Studies 52, 383–401.
Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. (1986), ‘A theory of exit in duopoly’, Econometrica 54(4), 943–960.
Ghemawat, P. (1984), ‘Capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry’, Journal of Industrial
Economics 32, 145–163.
Ghemawat, P. (1997), Games businesses play, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Ghemawat, P. & Nalebuff, B. (1985), ‘Exit’, Rand Journal of Economics 16, 184–194.
Ghemawat, P. & Nalebuff, B. (1990), ‘The devolution of declining industries’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 105(1), 167–186.
Gilbert, R. & Lieberman, M. (1987), ‘Investment and coordination in oligopolistic industries’, Rand
Journal of Economics 18(1), 17–33.
Grenadier, S. (1996), ‘The strategic exercise of options: Development cascades and overbuilding in
real estate markets’, Journal of Finance 51(2), 1653–1679.
Hall, E. (1990), ‘An analysis of preemptive behavior in the titanium dioxide industry’, International
Journal of Industrial Organization 8, 469–484.
Huisman, K. & Kort, P. (2004), ‘Strategic technology adoption taking into account future techno-
logical improvements’, European Journal of Operations Research 159, 705–728.
Lambert, B. & Perraudin, W. (2003), ‘Real options and pre-emption under incomplete information’,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27(4), 619–643.
Mason, R. & Weeds, H. (2007), Investment, uncertainty, and pre-emption, Working paper, Univer-
sity of Southampton, Southampton.
Pawlina, G. & Kort, P. (2006), ‘Real options in an asymmetric duopoly: Who benefits from your
competitive disadvantage?’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 15(1), 1–35.
Porter, M. (1980), Competitive Strategy, Free Press, New York.
9
Smets, F. (1991), Exporting versus foreign direct investment: The effect of uncertainty, irreversibil-
ities and strategic interactions, Working paper, Yale University, New Haven.
Tirole, J. (1988), The theory of industrial organization, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Whinston, M. (1988), ‘Exit with multiplant firms’, Rand Journal of Economics 19(4), 568–588.
Wood, A. (2005), ‘Investment interdependence and the coordination of lumpy investments: Evi-
dence from the British brick industry’, Applied Economics 37, 37–49.
10
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
ρ
H
(∞
)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
      
      
      
      
      
      
ρ
q¯
(∞
)
3∆
4∆
5∆
6∆
7∆
8∆
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
      
      
      
      
      
      
ρ
q¯
(∞
)
 
 
3∆
4∆
5∆
6∆
7∆
8∆
d=1
d=2
d=3
d=4
d=5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
      
      
      
      
      
      
ρ
q¯
(∞
)
 
 
3∆
4∆
5∆
6∆
7∆
8∆
d=1
d=2
d=3
d=4
d=5
Figure 1: Herfindahl index of firms’ capacities H(∞) (top left panel) and total capacity q¯(∞) un-
conditional (top right panel) and conditional on state of demand (bottom panels).
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Figure 2: Limiting distribution µ(∞). First equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Limiting distribution µ(∞). Second equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Limiting distribution µ(∞). Third equilibrium.
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